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THE COMMON LAW AND THE
ENVIRONMENT IN THE COURTS:
DISCUSSION OF CODE LAW AND
COMMON LAW
Bruce Yandlet

INTRODUCTION

Stuart Buck provides a strong review of common law
environmental protection, how it works, and how the record of
common law protection may be compared to the protections afforded
by statute law.' Buck's legal analysis is tightly focused on the way the
two systems operate; he also addresses the difficulty encountered
when trying to determine which system of law is to be preferred by
those who seek efficient and effective environmental protection. In
his final assessment, he becomes agnostic on the point of which is
best. Noting that common law has worked in many cases where it has
been used and that statute law is more systematic in the protections it
offers, Buck finds it difficult to choose between the two regimes.
Based on the data at hand, he cannot say which of the approaches is
best.
I generally agree with Buck's conclusion, which is to say that
based on the data he seeks to sift it is difficult to draw a final
conclusion as to which is best. However, there is more to the story.
The common law offers protection without the need for bringing
suits. Word gets out; property rights and the rule of law affect
t The author is Alumni Distinguished Professor of Economics Emeritus, Clemson
University, and Senior Fellow, Property and Environment Research Center, Bozeman, MT. He
acknowledges a debt of gratitude to Roger Meiners for his guidance and criticisms.
1 Stewart Buck, The Common Law & The Environment in the Courts, 58 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 621 (forthcoming 2008).
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behavior. In a sense, each property owner is made a deputy to defend
his own rights; monitoring costs fall; immediate action follows; this
deepens the effect of common law, which is to say that unlike the
technical standards associated with EPA permits, common law rules
based on property rights and commons sense get embedded in
behavioral norms..2 Of course, parallel but different statements may
be made about code law, but I am unable to conclude that
environmental code law as a process is superior or even equal to
common law protection of environmental assets. (In saying this, I call
attention to the words "environmental assets.") I say this for one
fundamental reason. The world where common law is a central
institution for generating and maintaining a property rights based
order is a very different world from one where legislative code law
and administrative regulations are the central order generating
institutions. Because of this, I believe it is impossible to make a
relative assessment of those two worlds by comparing their important
surface features, no matter how carefully one may seek to draw the
comparison. Other dimensions of the two worlds need to be
considered.
In this comment, I do four things. First, I discuss how the U.S.
abandoned common law as a central legal system and became a code
law country in the early 1970s. I also briefly seek to explain why this
sharp change in fundamental law occurred. I next discuss and
compare common law environmentalism with code law protection
and discuss Stuart Buck's final word on the subject. Third, I address
rent-seeking afforded by code law and discuss the implications of
this. The piece ends with some final thoughts about the relative merits
of common law versus code law protections.
THE RISE OF CODE LAW
In a changing political landscape, the U.S. became a code law
country in 1970. As shown in the accompanying chart, which reports
the count of new Federal Register pages from 1940 to the present,
1970 was the year when dramatic increases in federal regulation
emerged, following on the heels of major new statutes spawning
social regulation.

2 It may be worth noting that this social deepening effect may have contributed to
Mahoney's statistical findings regarding the economic superiority of common law countries in
producing wealth. Paul G. Mahoney, The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might
Be Right, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 503,503-525 (2001).
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This was the watershed year when the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration, and the Consumer Product Safety Administration
were formed along with other new federal regulatory agencies. The
organic legislation that formed the new agencies, and major statutes
that followed, raised expectations and then laid the groundwork for a
massive outflow of technical regulation that emerged. The new world
of regulation affected management of the workplace, production
processes, product design, and marketing practices in consumer
markets. A country previously regulated primarily by common law,
city ordinances, state statutes and regional compacts became a nation
regulated primarily by federal statutes. The default position changed.
A centralized effort to manage environmental risks replaced a
decentralized federalism that relied more on local control and
property rights. A part of the rising tide of new code law is seen in the
count of Federal Register pages. Most of the new pages of rules were
tied to regulations related to safety, health, consumer markets, and
environmental quality.
WHY 1970?
At this point, it is tempting simply to move on to discuss the rise of
code law and the decline of common law as contending legal regimes
for protecting environmental property rights. Doing so would avoid
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the difficult task of explaining why such a massive legal sea change
occurred in the 1970s. But instead of moving on, I will draw on the
work of other scholars to identity a rather amazing convergence of
social forces that created a strong demand for centralized government
and action at the highest level; a demand that able politicians were
happy to satisfy.
In his discussion of key social forces that played through the U.S.
in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Robert Higgs explains how the
political foundation was laid for a "crisis and Leviathan" government
reaction.. 3 Among the crises Higgs notes are racial disturbances, riots,
and the burning of cities. He includes reaction to the Vietnam War
and the accompanying draft that generated a massive peace
movement. As the turbulent 1960s rolled into the 1970s, the country
became split politically and American voters seemed ready to do
something about the problems that had emerged. The baby boomers
were coming of age and there were plenty of problems in the offing.
Along with these domestic social forces came international ones.
The U.S. and industrial world were hit with an Arab oil embargo that
caused crude oil and gasoline prices to quadruple. . An energy crisis
emerged. Higgs' Leviathan responded with the formation of a Federal
Energy Office to be followed by a Department of Energy and more
regulations. To top things off, the U.S. economy experienced a
serious bout with inflation. The Consumer Price Index rose from the
January 1966 rate of 1.92% to 3.48% in January 1967. 5 Then, with
inflation embedded in the economy, 1970 saw prices increasing at a
rate of 6.18%, eventually hitting 13.91% in 1980. The rise in inflation
was driven largely by Federal Reserve increases in the money
supply. 6 And then there was the environment. Major episodes of air
pollution occurred that could not be adequately explained. Oil spills
and the effects of government-sponsored uses of chemicals for pest
control emerged. The environment became a dominant theme in
songs and literature. Earth Day arrived, and the popular response was
massive.
When all was said and done, the period 1964 to 1976 saw major
statutes passed that addressed civil rights, highway traffic and auto
3

ROBERT HIGGS, CRISIS AND LEVIATHAN: CRITICAL EPISODES IN THE GROWTH OF

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 237-54 (Oxford Univ. Press 1987).

David Fischer, The Great Wave, New York: Oxford University Press (1996).
Inflationdata.com, Historical US Inflation Rate from 1914 to the Present,
http://inflationdata.com/inflation/Inflation-RateHistoricalInflation.aspx?dslnflation-currentPag
e=3 (last visited Feb. I1, 2008).
6 For example, the rate of growth of Ml rose from 3.3% in 1969 to 5.1% in 1970, 6.5%
4

5

in 1971, and to 9.2% in 1973. ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, H. Doc. 108-145, at 365
(2nd Sess. 2004).
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safety, consumer protection, clean air, water pollution control, energy,
consumer products, and occupational safety and health.7 Each of these
statutes called for regulatory actions that formed the new "social"
regulatory agencies. These, in turn, produced a massive increase in
code law. From 1970 through 1977, the number of pages in the Code
of Federal Regulations rose from 54,000 to 75,000, while the
expenditures of the new social regulatory agencies rose from $1,449.3
million in 1970 to $7,318.3 million in 1977.8 While the budget
numbers alone are large enough to catch ones attention, they are
probably swamped by the compliance costs they fostered. Within all
this, an appealing logic was provided for taking environmental
control to Washington, though little appeal to reason was needed.
Once on their way, air emissions and water pollution do not recognize
state lines. Yes, the states might be capable of taking care of things
within their boundaries, but the environmental problem was larger
than this. While logical, it is interesting that the boundary problem
was a small subset of the environmental problem, which has to do
with human exposure to hazards and is mostly local. It was not
necessary to nationalize control of every square mile of the nation to
get at the boundary problem. Indeed, statutes could have been devised
that targeted pollution sources that in fact discharge wastes that
traveled beyond the normal legal control net.
The expanding federal code law did not eliminate common law. In
most cases, there were savings clauses in the statutes that spawned the
code; these said that nothing in the legislation would preclude the
right of individuals to bring suit. But the statutes and code took
precedence over common law and state and local codes. Federalism
was weakened by a monopolized environmental regulator.
Prior to 1970, the state courts were the main venue for suits
involving environmental harm and environmental quality. In an effort
to see what happened to the frequency of state versus federal
environmental suits, Ceplo and Yandle reported a count of all
common law and statute law reported cases involving air and water
pollution that were brought in six western states from 1945 to 1993,
with the total annual actions divided by GDP. 9 Both common law and
federal actions began to expand in 1970. By 1987 the weighted count
7 Mahoney, supra note 2.
8

BENEFIT-COST
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SOcIAL

REGULATION:

STUDIES
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REGULATION 2 (James C. Miller III & Bruce Yandle eds., 1979).
9 See Karol Ceplo & Bruce Yandle, Western States and EnvironmentalFederalism:An
Examination ofInstitutional Viability, in ENVIROMENTAL FEDERALISM 225, 249-52 (Terry L.
Anderson & Peter J. Hill eds., 1997). The states were Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana,
New Mexico, and Texas.
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of federal suits eclipsed the number of actions brought at common
law. By then, a century of experience with common law
environmentalism and state, local, and regional environmental control
were beginning to fade into the legal landscape. Indeed, some today
might understandably hold the opinion that U.S. environmental
protection began de novo in 1970, and that we the living are lucky to
have survived the gunk and waste that accumulated without constraint
to that point. Even though common law might be saved, it mattered
little whether the lawyers who make the system work preferred code
law remedies or simply were not educated about common law.
Marlow Greene and I discovered just how pronounced the loss of
common law memory was in 1995 when we developed an informal
telephone survey of thirty-eight U.S. environmental law firms.' 0 We
presented a set of water pollution facts that involved a downstream
landowner whose property was being washed by industrial pollution
from an identified upstream discharger. Marlow was able to converse
effectively with attorneys at seventeen different firms. Without
prompting them beyond the facts, Marlow asked an attorney at each
firm what course of action he would recommend to the aggrieved
landowner. 1 Thirteen of the seventeen attorneys immediately
recommended organizing a citizen suit under the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act. Two attorneys recommended bringing a
common law suit. The other two offered no favored approach.
Generally speaking, the attorneys who favored code law actions saw
statute-based suits as being more predictable and therefore easier to
organize.
CAN WE COMPARE THE Two REGIMES?

The arrival of code law based on national statutes brought a
different kind of environmental law enforcement. Common law relied
on simple rules that had evolved to provide protection to owners and
occupiers of land who held environmental rights. This judge-made
law emerged from specific controversies that involved the parties
before the court and no others. When an upstream party imposed cost
on a downstream right holder against his will, there was a cause of
action against the party causing harm. To gain standing, the aggrieved
10BRUCE

YANDLE,

COMMON

SENSE AND

COMMON LAW FOR THE ENVIRONMENT:

CREATING WEALTH tN HUMMINGBIRD ECONOMIES 153-154

(Rowman & Littlefield, 1997).

1 Id. There was more than one question on the survey. In addition to asking what course
of action the attorney would recommend, a second question referred to the same set of water
pollution facts but noted that the polluter involved was operating within the limits of its EPA
discharge permit. In other words, the pollution was harmful but legal. Fourteen of the seventeen
recommended common law.
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party had to show damages or imminent threat of damages. One could
not bring a polluter to trial by simply complaining about a dislike of
pollution. Common law courts provided remedies to the damaged
parties that included injunction and damages. Of course, the recovery
process was not free, and plaintiffs rationed their actions. But
remedies could be quite costly; operators of industrial plants who
hoped to stay in business were wise to avoid litigation. 12
To avoid litigation, common law allowed individuals to contract
around common law rules. For example, at common law a property
owner downstream held a right not to be harmed by an upstream
discharger.13 Evidence of harmful pollution passing the property of a
downstream party is a cause of action against the polluter. To avoid
suit, an upstream discharger could contract with the downstream party
and provide compensation for use of the downstream party's
environmental rights. In short, common law provided protection to
right holders. The common law rule established a little recognized
market in environmental rights. In a way it is strange that modem
environmental economists celebrate so when market-like institutions
are unveiled for handling water quality and certain air emissions.
Contracting for environmental rights was an integral part of the old
common law.
The protection of rights provided by common law began with
individual right holders and extended to a large number of individuals
who might be similarly situated in facing an environmental harm. As
pointed out by Buck, the tort actions associated with nuisance and
trespass provide protection to individual right holders. 4 A public
nuisance tort action provided a common law remedy to a large
number of similarly situated individuals. In general, the remedy
sought involved both damages and, more importantly for
environmental harms, injunctions that stopped the harmful actions.
In contrast, the emergent code law drew on the organic statutes
from which the code emerged. The statutes and their attendant
regulations sought to achieve widely-applied standards for specific
pollutants in the case of air pollution and for overall improved
conditions in the case of water pollution. In no instances were the
organic statutes concerned directly with particular local conditions or
in protecting private property rights. When enforced and not violated,
the code protected the statute, which in so doing may indirectly
provide protection to the environment and right holders. The code
12

Roger Meiners & Bruce Yandle, Common Law and the Conceit of Modern

EnvironmentalPolicy,7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 923, 926-29 (1999)
13 id.
14 Id.
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approach also protected the legislative process, a key point returned to
below.
For example, under air and water pollution statutes, operators of
industrial air and water pollution sources must operate within the
limits of regulatory permits issued by state agencies with delegated
EPA authority. The control system operates under the theory that the
environment will be protected as long as dischargers stay within the
limits of a permit. Unfortunately, rivers and streams can die
biologically while point source dischargers operate within the legal
limits. It has just been in recent years that the EPA has begun to focus
its water quality regulation on total loads. Code law is different in
another fundamental way. Unlike common law penalties that go to
damaged parties, revenues collected from code law penalties go to the
United States Treasury, not to damaged private parties.
Environmental statute law is not based on property rights and offers
no compensation to damaged parties. There is yet one last concern
that arises when a generation becomes accustomed to expecting the
government to take care of important aspects of life. We now have a
generation raised with the belief that the environment is the
government's responsibility. If there is a problem, you call your
representative or the EPA; few people even think of private
enforcement.
STUART BUCK'S FINAL WORD
Stuart Buck's comparison of relative effectiveness in providing
environmental protection ended with a draw, or better stated, an
indeterminate outcome. As stated before, I agree totally with Buck's
final frustrated conclusion, but for reasons other than those given by
Buck. Neither code law nor common law is designed to provide direct
protection to some list of environmental assets. Perhaps it bears
repeating. Code law is designed to protect the statute that spawned the
code. Common law evolved to protect holders of property rights and
to prevent the right holder from being damaged. In the absence of
defined environmental property rights, neither system is designed to
directly protect environmental resources other than those with defined
rights. When environmental property rights are defined and enforced,
common law offers an effective vehicle for protecting those rights.
When the technical rules that emerge from environmental statutes
map directly to environmental protection, code law may be an
effective environmental protection vehicle. Neither code law nor
common law addresses global climate change, C02 emissions,
crowded expressways, concentrated automobile emissions on urban
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highways, and a host of other environmental conditions that many
would include in the term "environment." However, while Buck did
come to a draw, he described the data that would be needed to make a
determination, recognizing that the data would never be forthcoming.
AN ATTRACTION TO CODE LAW

Roger Meiners' and my review of common law environmentalism
led us to conclude that the common law was displaced by code law
because common law was potentially too effective in protecting
environmental assets15 . We stated that:
Statute law displaced common law for precisely the opposite
reasons generally offered by those who extol statute law's
virtues. Critics of common law argue that common law
protection is unreliable in that bad consequences still happen
despite the law, that evidence of cause and effect is difficult
to provide, and that enforcement is subject to unpredictable
whims of common law judges and juries.... We contend that
common law environmental protection was, if anything, too
strict for those who wanted to generate pollution with greater
impunity. At common law, there were no EPA permits or
uniform technology requirements that sanctioned the action
of the polluter. 16
We arrived at this conclusion by reviewing decades of common
law cases and noting how tough common law protection could be.
Common law rules varied across states and regions. There was no
federal common law enforced within states, but federal common law
did exist for disputes that involved parties in more than one state.
Code law does not impose injunctions; it does not shut down
polluters. Common law did. Common law enforcement did not
systematically recognize the economic importance of polluters in
making
enforcement determinations. The developers of code law
17
did.

15

Meiners & Yandle, supranote 12, 926-29.

6 Id. at 956.
IS Meiners and I are not alone in our assessment of the logic supporting the move from
common law protection to code law enforcement. Noting that the record for state and local
environmental protection was far from perfect, David Schoenbrod points out: "But the states
had been making progress in controlling pollution-progress that was significant compared with
what the federal government later accomplished-and the auto and coal-mining industries asked
Congress to establish a federal regulatory agency to slow down the states." DAVID SHOENBROD,
SAVING OUR ENVIRONMENT FROM WASHINGTON 132 (Yale Univ. Press 2005).
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Perhaps one should consider the following thought experiment
when seeking to determine which of the two regimes is most
effective. If you were the mayor of a city located on a river
downstream from a steel producing center and your goal was to
facilitate protection of the private and public assets of your
community, would you prefer to devote resources to lobby the
national government for statutes and codes that would specify
operating conditions for the upstream steel mills, hoping to be
successful in imposing zero discharge standards on the mills, or
would you devote resources to monitoring and measuring pollution
that entered the river so that you could rely on common law to protect
the right holders in your community? Of course, the outcome that
might be intellectually appealing is not necessarily the one that is
politically appealing.
CODE LAW AND RENT SEEKING

Going head to head with the steel producers in lobbying for
regulations described in the thought experiment forces us to consider
the political economy of code law, which is a minor consideration
when assessing common law. The movement to federal code law that
emerged in the late 1960s and early 1970s brought with it enhanced
opportunities for special interest rent seekers to cartelize industries
and markets. Prior to nationalization of environmental regulation, it
would have been incredibly costly, for industry or environmental
lobbyists successfully to lobby every state legislature and obtain a
uniform rule that would affect every firm in a national industry. To
lobby every common law judge in the hopes of obtaining favorable
decisions across the nation would have been even more improbable.
Yet common law courts occasionally seemed to give in to the power
of special interests. As Buck points out, an 1886 Pennsylvania
common law judge in Sanderson v. Pennsylvania Coal Co.1 8 citing
the relative economic importance of a coal company versus a single
landowner, gave an opinion favoring a coal company in a suit brought
by a citizen whose common law rights had been invaded. But the
result was just one bad decision affecting one state, not a ruling that
would be applied to all coal operators across the nation. Common law
was capable of correcting itself in relatively short order, at least in
another jurisdiction. In the 1900 New York case of Strobel v. Kerr
Salt Co19., reference was made to denial of damages in Pennsylvania
Coal,but the New York high court awarded damages to the plaintiff.
18 113 Pa. 126 (1886).
'9

164 N.Y. 303 (1900).
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The common law rule was upheld. The polluter paid the damaged
party. The NY high court noted at 317 that the Pennsylvania court in
Strobel was "influenced by the necessities of a great industry." But it
rejected that approach (as did most states) and said at 319 "We have
never adopted that rule in this state" (it was overturning a decision by
a lower court that would have allowed water pollution by the Kerr
Salt Co.) At 320 the court said "The rule of the ancient common law
is still in force." And at 321-22, the court said "The lower riparian
owners are entitled to a fair participation in the use of the water and
their rights cannot be cut down by the convenience or necessity of the
defendant's business."
The old common law, though not always, could also be tough on
emitters of air pollution from copper operations in a two state setting.
20
For example, in the early case Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.,
Justice Holmes noted that a public nuisance had been created because
the "sulphurous fumes cause and threaten damage on so considerable
a scale to the forests and vegetable life, if not to health, within
Yet while the smelter operator argued that new
[Georgia].'
improved technologies had been installed to reduce the damage, the
Court held for Georgia, ordered the smelter to take action further to
reduce pollution to Georgia's satisfaction and to remain under
supervision of the Court until the plaintiff was satisfied.
In contrast, when the U.S. EPA made the emission guidelines final
for U.S. copper smelters in the 1970s and announced that there would
never be another green field copper smelter built in the United States,
copper prices rose and massive amounts of wealth were transferred
from consumers to owners of copper firms.22 I should note that it was
the nature of the EPA regulations specified by Congress that
transferred wealth to the copper shareholders. Command-and-control
regulation with differential standards that impose higher cost on new
plant construction did the job. Sadly for those seeking cleaner air, the
guidelines meant that old smelters would operate longer than they
might have otherwise. Air quality did improve somewhat. In a similar
way, the code law regime that evolved in the post-1970 period made
it possible for lobbyists for Eastern high sulfur coal producers and
coal miners to obtain a statute that effectively eliminated the
competitive advantage of Western clean coal producers in the entire
Eastern United States, led to higher priced electricity for consumers in
20 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
21 Id.at

238.

22 Michael T. Maloney & Robert E. McCormick, A Positive Theory of Environmental

QualityRegulation, 25 J.L. & ECON. 99 (1982).
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the region, and did little to produce additional clean air.23 While one
can find common law decisions that seem strange if not downright
inefficient, there is a massive rent-seeking literature that documents
what some term the systematic "unintended consequences" of federal
code law. Yet if something is systematic across time, it becomes
difficult to call the outcomes unintended.24 In assessing the
anticompetitive character of environmental code law, David
Schoenbrod, a New York University Law School professor and
former senior litigator with the Natural Resources Defense Council,
put it this way:
Major corporations today understand that the EPA provides
them with substantial benefits. Its lawmaking is necessarily
slow because of procedural requirements imposed by
Congress and the courts. The EPA also buffers large
corporations from competition from small and emerging
businesses. . .A powerful EPA is good for many big
businesses and all national legislators, but bad for small
businesses and local flexibility-good for national advocacy
organizations and industries that sell pollution control
services, but bad
for civic and neighborhood associations and
25
the rest of us.
BUT How BAD IS IT?
Unintended consequences may lead to outcomes that cartelize
industries and feather the nests of some polluters, but what about the
environment? Is it still possible that in spite of all the rent seeking,
code law outcomes still provide effective environmental protection?
Unfortunately, as Buck points out, the data does not exist to answer
the question. Yet achieving effective environmental protection would
not necessarily mean that the goal had been achieved at least cost.
Indeed, the literature is replete with studies that show how the EPA's
mandated command-and-control regulation, which is based on inputs,
not outcomes, is generally the most costly way to provide
23 BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR (Yale Univ.
Press 1981).
24 For 30 years and through bureaucratic interpretation of New Source Performance
Standards under the Clean Air Act, the EPA allowed the nation's coal-fired utilities to operate
older more polluting plants without requiring them to meet tougher new plant standards. The
issue was finally put to rest bv the Court on April 2, 2007 in Environmental Defense v. Duke
Energy, 549 U.S. 561 (2007).
25 SCHOENBROD, supra note 17, at 13-14.
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environmental protection. Common law remedies, on the other hand,
are based on outcomes, not inputs.
We know that major dimensions of air quality have improved
markedly since 1970, but we also know that air quality was
improving markedly before 1970.26 For example, David Schoenbrod
describes the situation this way:
After 1970 the states acted under EPA supervision, so it
deserves some of the credit, but how much? The states did
more in the 1960s to reduce sulfur emissions than was
accomplished in the 1970s, when the EPA was presiding. The
states in the 1960s tended to go after the cheapest and easiest
reductions, but they deserve credit for acting when support
for pollution control was still building. Their accomplishment
is part of the record that shows that the will for pollution
reduction did not come from the EPA on high.27
As Stuart Buck points out, Indur Goklany's painstaking work on
U.S. air pollution indicates that progress was being made prior to
1970 and that the way emissions fall through time suggests the
imprint of technological change and community recognition of harms
28
that may accompany pollution.
Yet while environmental quality has improved significantly, we
cannot know how much of the stimulus comes from code law versus
higher priced energy and related technological change. We know less
about water quality, simply because unlike the case for air there is no
national system of water quality monitoring data and no standardized
way for states to report conditions of rivers, lakes and streams.
Indeed, there are reasons to believe that while industrial pollution has
fallen substantially, discharge from public and agricultural sources,
which are somewhat immune to common law suits in the case of
municipal treatment plants and exempt from federal water pollution
statutes in the case of agriculture,, has increased markedly.
Hints as to the magnitude of code law's failure to deliver
environmental improvement are found in anecdotal data that go back
to the late 1980s and come forward. Included is EPA's own 1987 self
study that concluded that the agency, following congressional
direction, had assigned its enforcement resources in reverse order to
26 For more discussion and documentation of the points to follow, see Meiners and
Yandle, supra note 12, at 923-24.
27 SCHOENBROD, supra note 17, at 49.

28 INDUR M. GOKLANY, CLEANING THE AIR: THE REAL STORY OF THE WAR ON

POLLUTION, 87-98 (Cato Inst. 1999).
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the seriousness of environmental risks. 29 More resources were
committed to low risk problems than those with higher risk. Then,
there was a series of New York Times articles that included
interviews with former EPA Administrators and other environmental
leaders. The series concluded that code law protection had basically
failed to deliver. 30 To this is added the 1997 conclusion reached by
researchers at Resources for the Future, who in essence said the code
law system for protecting the environment is broken and must be
fixed. 3 1 Finally, there is the 2005 OECD report card on the U.S. that
criticized the U.S. command and control approach but praised the
flexibility being introduced as regulation devolves to local and state
regulators.3 2 In effect, the OECD report card assigned high marks to
common law characteristics-flexibility and local control-now
taking hold in newer environmental statutes.
Taken together, these pronouncements do not mean that American
citizens are wading through more sludge today than in the late 1960s,
nor does it mean that the U.S. EPA has completely missed targets in
reducing serious environmental risks. What it may mean, given the
sketchiness of the data and the massive size of the environmental
economy, is that code law should not be celebrated as superior to a
common law regime just because that's the way we do it, and things
are getting better. Going further, we who prize the environment and
our economic freedoms should be concerned that even now we lack
the monitoring infrastructure to know with greater certainty how we
are performing in protecting environmental assets. The fact that the
infrastructure is still sketchy after more than 30 years suggests that
control priorities are not associated with outcomes. Yet, singing
common law's praises is not the same thing as recommending that the
U.S. should return to the common law of yesterday. Nor is this the
same as saying that one approach such as common law should be
used for managing all dimensions of the environment. There can be
no institutional silver bullet that works for everything. Instead, a
useful criticism of competing legal regimes might best support an
institutional evolution of the sort that has characterized common law
for centuries. Based on what we know, a feature of that evolution
should allow for more local and state control, greater opportunities to
29 ENVIRONMENTAL

PROTECTION AGENCY, UNFINISHED BUSINESS: A COMPARATIVE

ASSESSMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS-OVERVIEW REPORT. (Feb. 1987).
30 Keith Schneider, Neiv View Calls EnvironmentalPolicy Misguided, N.Y TIMES (March

21, 1993) at 1.

31 CLARENCE DAVIES AND JANICE MAZUREK, DOES THE U.S. SYSTEM WORK?
RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE (1997).
32 ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, ENVIRONMENTAL
REPORT CARD FOR THE U.S. (Jan. 2006).
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use common law courts, and an enabling of federal common law that
allows for common law suits in multi-state disputes.

